The Appeal (ἔκκλητος) in Antiquity and the Early Christian Era

Abstract

In order to understand the nature of the judicial processes of the late Antiquity period, which is especially relevant for understanding the principles of the implementation of the court in the Church, it is necessary to consider the earliest formative period. After introducing the basic terminology used in connection with the appellate court, the article first examines the appeal in Ancient Greece and Rome, and then the appeal in the early Roman Empire — in the period when the Church, being persecuted, did not resort to institutional reproduction of state judicial practice. These two periods are diametrically opposed in terms of appellate practice: in the ancient era, the highest judicial authority in both Greece and Rome was the people’s assembly, and in the imperial period, the highest judicial power began to be concentrated in the hands of the emperor. For church legislation, both the ancient judicial tradition and the legislation of the Roman Empire are important, which, however, will not be reproduced in it verbatim. The article is limited to the initial stage of the pre-church civil court. This stage contains a number of interesting details, such as the ban on retrial, in light of which an appeal is merely an exception to the rule.