Marius Victorinus’ doctrine on the soul and its place in the hierarchy of beings

Abstract

This article deals with Marius Victorinus’ (ca. 281/291-382) doctrine on the soul, its nature, origin and place in the hierarchy of beings represented in his theological treatises on the Trinity. The author proposes an original reconstruction of the psychological doctrine of Victorinus, according to whom the souls occupy a middle, or intermediate position in the hierarchy of beings. At the same time their position is not static, but dynamic. There is also a world-soul, or universal soul, which penetrates all parts of the world and becomes the source of individual souls. Regarding the question on the origin of souls, Victorinus seeks to reconcile the biblical and Platonic doctrines. The author shows that, according to Victorinus, the soul is an independent entity or substance, since it has an independent existence and becomes a subject of the Divine Intellect and Spirit. The nature of the soul is determined by three main features: intellection, self-movement and incorporeality, which coincide with the very substance of the soul. Every human soul from eternity possesses the images of eternal Divine ideas; in order to grasp them, the soul has to receive enlightenment from the Divine Logos. Two types of thinking are inherent to the soul: first, simple and pure intellectual thinking directed to the intelligible beings and the soul itself; secondly, a thinking through senses which is an imitation of true thinking. The soul, even in a state of its union with a body, possesses an opportunity to return to God and to contemplate him directly. The characteristic feature of Victorinus’ doctrine on the soul is the predominance of platonic and philosophical elements over Christian and theological ones, so that his teaching seems internally contradictory and incoherent.