Aristotelian doctrine of the soul in the treatise of Nemesius of Emesa “On the nature of man”: Criticism and reception

Abstract

The article deals with the reception of Aristotle’s doctrine on soul and its faculties by the Christian thinker Nemesius of Emesa in his treatise “On human nature”. Several points are considered: the Aristotelian definition of both man, and soul as the first entelechy of the natural organic body, which Nemesius subjects to a critical analysis, opposing it to the Platonic conception of the soul as an immortal, immaterial and independent substance, endowed with life and movement. Although Nemesius adopts Aristotle’s views on the structure of the human soul and its faculties (the faculty of growth, sensation, movement, desire and reasoning) and its two parts - rational and irrational, nevertheless his psychological doctrine could be viewed as eclectic, since the Aristotelian concepts here are combined with some Platonic and Stoic views. Nemesius also adopts the Aristotelian doctrine on pleasure, happiness and virtue. Finally, a important place is given to the reception of the Aristotelian doctrine on the freedom of choice and the act of will. It is suggested that in viewing free choice as a synthesis of desire, reflection and decision, Nemesius is more independent from Aristotle’s thought. It is stated that Nemesius’ doctrine on soul and its faculties, where different opinions of various philosophical schools (including the school of Aristotle) were gathered together and combined with Christian views on human nature, had a great impact on the subsequent development of Christian anthropology and psychology both in Byzantine theology, and in Western scholastic philosophy.