The Polemic Between J. Searle and D. Dennett from the Perspective of Christian Apologetics

Abstract

The article discusses the views of J. R. Searle and D. C. Dennett on the nature of consciousness and their polemic. Both philosophers are materialists but take different positions on the problem of consciousness: Dennett claims that mental phenomena can be completely reduced to physical (reductionism), while Searl maintains ontological irreducibility of the former (antireductionism). The author states their world views, including attitudes towards religion, and briefly discusses the main theoretic constructs they use: emergentism, the Chinese room, types of reduction and subjectivity according to Searle, pandemonium, memes, verificationism and heterophenomenology according to Dennett. It is shown that discussions between reductionists and antireductionists reveal substantial contradictions in contemporary materialism, which may by used by Christian apologetics not only for critics, but as a starting point for a dialog as well.