The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy: A Review of the Main Approaches
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31802/2658-7491-2019-1-1-158-178Keywords:
philosophy of mind, mind-body problem, Christian apologetics, Cartesianism, materialism, physicalism, reductionism, antireductionism, epiphenomenalism, computer metaphorAbstract
The objective of the article is to review modern approaches to interaction between the mental and the physical in the human person in the analytic philosophy. It starts with the critical comparison between the mind-body dualism, inaugurated by Descartes, and the materialistic reductionism including the identity theory and functionalism. The next step is to discuss some more “compromising” approaches as the antireductionism and the property dualism including the epiphenomenalism. The author discusses the question, to which extent the human brain may be compared to a computer (the computer metaphor). Each solution is supplemented with the key pro and contra arguments, while the mind philosophy is evaluated from the positions of its instrumentality for the Christian apologetics. The author shows the connections between modern approaches and works of the Russian researchers on the early 20th century (G. Chelpanov,V. Zenkovsky).
Downloads
References
Васильев В. В. Трудная проблема сознания. М.: Прогресс-Традиция, 2009.
Зеньковский В. В. Современное состояние психофизической проблемы. Киев: Тип. Имп. ун-та св. Владимира, 1905.
Лихи Т. История современной психологии. СПб.: Питер, 2003.
Парпара А. А. Психофизическая проблема в онтологии протоиерея Василия Зеньковского // Богословский вестник. 2016. Т. 22-23. № 3-4. С. 78-99.
Пенроуз Р. Новый ум короля. О компьютерах, мышлении и законах физики. М.: УРСС, 2005.
Прист С. Теории сознания. М.: Идея-Пресс, Дом интеллектуальной книги, 2000.
Серл Дж. Открывая сознание заново. М.: Идея-Пресс, 2002.
Смазневич И. Искусный интеллект // Русский репортер. 2018. № 19 (458). С. 52-57.
Чалмерс Д. Сознающий ум. М.: Книжный дом "ЛИБРОКОМ", 2013.
Челпанов Г. И. Мозг и душа. Критика материализма и очерк современных учений о душе. М.: Типо-литография Т-ва И. Н. Кушнарев и Ко, 1912.
Юм Д. Трактат о человеческой природе, или попытка применить основанный на опыте метод рассуждения к моральным предметам // Юм. Д. Сочинения в двух томах. Т. 1. М.: Мысль, 1996. С. 53-656.
Botter B. "Se l›occhio fosse un animale la sua vista sarebbe l›anima". L›unità di anima e corpo nella filosofía aristotelica // M. Giannasi, F. Guadalupe Masi (Ed.) Il problema mentecorpo. Genealogia, modelli, prospettive. Milano: Mimesis, 2008. P. 15-34.
Dennett D. C. The self as a responding-and responsible-artifact // Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 2003. Oct. V. 1001. P. 39-50.
Gennaro R. J. (Ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Routledge, 2018.
Jackson F. Epiphenomenal Qualia // Philosophical Quarterly. 1982. V. 32. P. 127-136.
Libet B., Gleason C. A., Wright E. W., Pearl D. K. Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential) - The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act // Brain. 1983. V. 106. P. 623-642.
Libet B. Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action // The Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1985. V. 8. P. 529-566.
Ludwig K. (Ed.) Donald Davidson. Cambridge, 2003. P. 115-132.
Nagel T. What Is It Like to Be a Bat? // The Philosophical Review. 1974. V. 83. No. 4. P. 435-450.
Nagel T. Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Read R., Richman K. A. (Eds.) The New Hume Debate: Revised Edition. New York: Routledge, 2000.
Ryle G. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson House, 1949.
Searle J. R. Minds, brains, and programs // Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1980. V. 3. P. 417-424.
Swinburne R. The Evolution of the Soul. Revised edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
